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In this paper, the following question is posed: Can the New Keynesian
Open Economy Model by Galí and Monacelli (2005b) explain “Six Ma-
jor Puzzles in International Macroeconomics”, as documented in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000b)?
The model features a small open economy with complete markets, Calvo
sticky prices and monopolistic competition. As extensions, I explore the
effects of an estimated Taylor rule and additional trade costs. After trans-
lating the six puzzles into moment conditions for the model, I estimate
the five most effective parameters using simulated method of moments
(SMM) to fit the moment conditions implied by the data. Given the sim-
plicity of the model, its fit is surprisingly good: among other things, the
home bias puzzles can easily be replicated, the exchange rate volatility
is formidably increased and the exchange rate correlation pattern is rel-
atively close to realistic values. Trade costs are one important ingredient
for this finding.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
paradigm is the basis for most open economy macroeconomic models.1 Since
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), models with a small set of shocks and frictions are
widely used for the analysis of policies, especially monetary policy. The com-
parative simplicity of these models has two implications. On the one hand, the
working mechanisms of these models are easily understood. On the other hand,
the connection between these stylized models and real world problems can be
easily questioned. Researchers have reacted to this in two ways. First, they
have built New Keynesian DSGE models with more shocks and frictions. Adolf-
son, Laséen, Lindé and Villani (2005) and the IMF’s Global Economy Model, as
presented in Pesenti (2008) are good examples for this approach, and more are
to come. Loosing some of their simplicity and tractability, these papers gain in
terms of realism and applicability. Second, researchers have tried to assess the
actual quality of the stylized models when confronted with the data, or at least
with specific aspects of it. Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) are two examples for this approach.
In this paper, this second way is followed. A specific stylized New Keynesian
DSGE model is confronted to a specific set of first and second moments of inter-
national macroeconomic data. The model used is the one by Galí and Monacelli
(2005b). This model is also reprinted in the textbook by Galí (2008) and can be
regarded as a prototype of New Keynesian Open Economy Models.2 The main
components of this kind of models are a forward looking Phillips curve, a dy-
namic IS-curve and Calvo (1983) sticky prices. The open economy assumptions
in this model are a small open economy versus the rest of the world, modeled
as the limiting case of a two country world with one country infinitely small
such that it does not influence the other, producer currency pricing, and com-
plete financial markets. I modify the model in three respects. First, I disregard
the multi-country framework, as is done in previous versions of that paper, see
Galí and Monacelli (2002), henceforth GM. Second, besides the four monetary
policy rules analyzed in Galí and Monacelli (2005b), I include an alternative
Taylor rule monetary policy as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) which is
more suitable for estimation issues. Third, I allow for the possibility of costs to
trade in goods, following the suggestion by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b).3
Regarding the data, I focus on the “Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics" as presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b), henceforth OR.
1Instead of New Keynesian, the labels New Neoclassical Synthesis and – especially for the
open economy – New Open Economy Macroeconomics are used interchangeably. A survey on
New Open Economy Models can be found in Lane (2001).
2McCallum and Nelson (2001, p. 10) call this model a “standard" model that they use as a
benchmark with which to compare their own model.
3Thus, I am putting Obstfeld and Rogoff’s idea to a test “in a much richer framework featuring
imperfect competition plus sticky prices". See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, pp. 340f.).
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These are (1) the home bias in trade puzzle, (2) the high investment-savings
correlation, (3) the home bias in equity portfolio puzzle, (4) the low interna-
tional consumption correlation, (5) the purchasing power parity puzzle and (6)
the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. In applying the GM model – extended for
trade costs – to the OR puzzles this paper features a second motivation: while
Obstfeld and Rogoff only sketch their idea of the effects of trade costs, this
paper features a complete DSGE analysis of these effects.
For different sets of parameters, three different procedures are applied in
order to “take the model to the data": First, I calibrate those parameters that
have agreed-upon values or that are unimportant with respect to the six puz-
zles. In a next step, I estimate the Taylor rule parameters using generalized
method of moments (GMM). Also, I use estimates for the assumed exogenous
processes. In this step, I follow Galí and Monacelli (2005b, p. 723) in us-
ing data for Canada as “a prototype small open economy". The third and last
procedure is simulated method of moments (SMM). This method is used to
set the five most important parameters such that the distance between model
moments and the data moments from the six puzzles is minimized. The param-
eters are those for trade costs, degree of openness, Calvo price stickiness, the
international elasticity of substitution and relative risk aversion.
I come to the conclusion that the model can easily explain puzzles (1)
and (3), thanks to the combination of trade costs and the degree of openness
parameter, the “home bias in preferences" parameter mentioned in OR. The
investment-savings puzzle is addressed only indirectly by means of a relation
between net exports and the real interest rate, where the expected negative
correlation is reproduced. The biggest deficiency of the model is that interna-
tional output correlation is way too low, and the real exchange rate volatility
and its correlation pattern is not exactly in line with the data.
Compared to a case without trade costs and without degree of openness
parameter, the combination of the two elements leads to better results for all
the puzzles. Very high values for the two home bias puzzles (1) and (3) can
be replicated. The result of puzzle (2) remains stable, but it is now possible
to also address the last three puzzles to some degree. The high exchange rate
volatility of the data can be achieved by a combination of a high risk aversion
as in Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), sizeable trade costs and a low degree
of openness. The “disconnectedness" of real exchange rate volatility, i.e., the
fact that real exchange rates are by far more volatile than any other macroeco-
nomic aggregate – one part of the “disconnect" puzzle – is reproduced relatively
well. But the second dimension of the “disconnect" puzzle, i.e., the low correla-
tion between the real exchange rate and all other macroeconomic aggregates,
is not explained by the model. Instead, the model features a positive correla-
tion between the real exchange rate and output. The biggest weakness of the
model is with respect to the international consumption correlations relative to
the international output correlation. Output is by far not enough correlated
internationally in the model.
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The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. Sec-
tion 3 briefly sketches the puzzles and the implied moments for the parametriza-
tion process. Section 4 explains the parametrization methods and choices. Re-
sults are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
There are two countries, the home country (H) and the foreign country (the
“rest of the world", F). If not indicated differently, the following applies to
both of them, whereas foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. There are
infinitely long living households, which experience utility from consumption of
home and of foreign goods. Firms produce in monopolistic competition, and
governments collect taxes, pay transfers and conduct monetary policy with an
interest rate rule. The same applies to the foreign economy, except for the
fact that foreign households’ consumption of home goods is negligibly small
for them. While international financial markets are complete, there is a friction
in the goods market: Transportation of goods from one country to another
decreases its quantity by the factor κ, which can be understood as "iceberg
melting".
2.1.1 Preferences
A representative household decides about its expected infinite labor supply and
consumption to maximize its utility, which is assumed to be separable between





β t[U(Ct)− V (Nt)] , (1)
where U is defined as U(Ct) ≡
C1−σt
1−σ and V as V (Nt) ≡
N1+ϕt
1+ϕ . The parameters
used are discount factor β , constant of relative risk aversion σ and elasticity of


















CF,t and CH,t are indices related to the consumption of foreign and domestic











, j ∈ {H; F}, (3)
with η being the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
and ε the elasticity of substitution between goods of the same country.
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2.1.2 Endowment
Each household is endowed with one unit of time per period.
2.1.3 Technology
Each domestic firm i ∈ [0;1] produces its output Yt(i)with production technol-
ogy Yt(i) = At Nt(i), where log(At) = at = ρaat−1+εt is stochastic productivity.
To simplify matters, production in the rest of the world is assumed to evolve
exogenously according to log(Y ∗t )− log Ȳ








Households have complete information until and including the current period,
and they have rational expectations about future periods. The same applies to
firms and governments.
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Households work at firms in their own country, pay lump-sum taxes, and trade
nominal bonds which include shares in firms of all countries. They have access
to a complete set of internationally traded contingent claims. Firms hire labor,
produce, and sell their goods at home and abroad under monopolistic compe-
tition. They set prices for all markets in domestic currency (producer currency
pricing) according to the Calvo (1983) price stickiness. Finally, they receive a
wage subsidy τ. Governments receive lump- sum taxes Tt , pay wage subsidies,
and are not allowed to accumulate debt. Monetary policy is made by setting
the nominal interest rate.
2.2.1 Competitive Equilibrium: Households
The budget constraint domestic households are faced with each period t is
∫ 1
0
[PH,t(i)CH,t(i)+ PF,t(i)CF,t(i)]di+ Et{Q t,t+1Dt+1} ≤ Dt +Wt Nt + Tt , (4)
with Q t,t+1 the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs, related to the
gross return Rt by Et(Q t,t+1) =
1
Rt
. Dt+1 is the nominal payoff in period t + 1
of a portfolio held at the end of period t. This portfolio includes shares in firms,
and its payoff is cum dividend. As markets are complete, there is a complete set
of state-contingent claims, traded internationally. Wt is the nominal wage and
























with an asterisk denoting a foreign variable and Et the nominal exchange rate,
defined as the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency.
Price indices are the result of expenditure minimization for a given level
of consumption. This minimization leads to the following outcomes: The con-
sumer price index (CPI) comprises all consumption goods, i.e., domestic and








PH,t and PF,t are the price indices of domestic and foreign goods, respectively,










∀ j ∈ {H, F} . (7)
Here, ε measures the elasticity of substitution between firms i within each
country. The same equations hold for the rest of the world, with the slight
difference that, since the rest of the world’s imports from the small open econ-
omy are so small, their weighting coefficient α∗ is assumed to be negligible.
This means that P∗H,t , the price index of domestic products in foreign currency,
has no influence on the world consumer price index for limα∗→0. This implies
P∗F,t = P
∗
t , where an asterisk denotes the world economy.
The first differences of the logarithms of the price levels are the CPI infla-
tion πt ≡ log(Pt) − log(Pt−1) and the domestic goods (price index) inflation
πH,t ≡ log(PH,t)− log(PH,t−1).4 For the world economy it follows from above
that π∗F,t = π
∗
t .
2.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium: Firms
A firm’s profits are turnover minus total costs, PH,t(i)Yt(i) − (1 − τ)Wt Nt(i),
where the employment subsidy τ lowers the costs of labor. Thus, nominal
marginal costs5 are MCnt = (1−τ)Wt/At . In the Calvo (1983) staggered price
setting scheme, the possibility to reset prices cannot be guaranteed at every
period: each period, only the fraction 1 − θ of the firms can reset prices.6







θ kEt{Q t,t+k[Yt+k(i)(PH,t(i)−MCnt+k)]} , (8)
4Throughout the paper small, Latin letters are used to denote that log-linearization around
the steady state has taken place. For the inflation rates given in the text, this steady state can be
dropped, as it is zero. More on the steady state is provided in Section A.1 in the appendix.
5Observe that nominal total costs T Cnt (i) = (1 − τ)Wt Nt(i) = (1 − τ)Wt Yt(i)/At , so that
MCnt (i) = ∂ T C
n
t (i)/∂ Yt(i) = (1−τ)Wt/At .
6The assumption is “that each price-setter (or firm) is allowed to change his price whenever
a random signal is ’lit up’, see Calvo (1983, p. 383).
7The maximization problem is derived and explained in Section A.5 in the appendix.
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2.2.3 Competitive Equilibrium: Governments




τWt Nt(i)di, with T lump sum taxes and τ an employment subsidy.
The fiscal authority acts solely to offset the distortion through monopolistic
competition. World fiscal policy symmetric, with variables T ∗t , τ
∗, W ∗t , N
∗
t (i).
Monetary policy in the rest of the world is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule
that fully stabilizes its inflation rate and the output gap. For the small open
economy, I deviate from GM, who look at the three different monetary policy
regimes domestic inflation targeting (DIT), CPI inflation targeting (CIT) and an
exchange rate peg. Instead, to make the model more realistic and to alleviate
the model’s capability to match empirical data, I follow Clarida et al. (1998)
and include a Taylor rule (TR):
rt = r r t +ΦππH,t +Φy(yt − ȳt) , (10)
where r is a nominal short-term interest rate, r r the natural interest rate, πH
the domestic goods inflation rate, and ȳt the natural level of output.
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2.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium: Trade
There are three exchange rates in this model. The nominal exchange rate is
the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency. As in OR, I allow
for “iceberg"-type costs of trade in the goods market like transportation costs,
tariffs etc. These costs affect the economy in such a way that only a fraction
1 − κ of each good exported arrives at the destination market, whereas the
other fraction κ “melts away" in the trade process. As markets are competitive
internationally, arbitrage considerations force this effect to show up in cross-
border price index relations. For the price of foreign goods, this implies:
P∗F,tEt = (1−κ)PF,t , (11)
whereas for the price of home goods, these have to sell cheaper abroad:
(1−κ)P∗H,tEt = PH,t . (12)
Log-linearizing (11) and (12) around the steady state and rearranging results
in
pF,t = et + p
∗
F,t (13)
8The expression “natural" is meant to indicate a situation without nominal frictions.
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pH,t = et + p
∗
H,t , (14)
where lower bar letters denote log-deviations of the upper bar letters around
steady state, which is described in Section A.1 in the appendix. The terms of
trade are the price of foreign goods in terms of home goods. In the small open
economy, this might read S soet = PF,t/PH,t , whereas for the world economy




H,t . Notice, however, that the terms of trade in the last
two equations differ by the constant factor (1 − κ)2, according to Equations
(11) and (12). One could choose either the small open economy’s price ratio
or the world economy’s price ratio for the definition of the terms of trade –











For the log-linear terms of trade,
st = pF,t − pH,t , (16)
since p∗F,t = p
∗
t as limα∗→0. The real exchange rate is the ratio of the two
consumer price indices, measured in domestic currency:
Qt ≡ Et P∗t /Pt . (17)
In terms of log deviations from steady state, the log real exchange rate qt ≡
log(Qt)− log(Q) is given as follows:
qt = et + p
∗
t − pt . (18)
Because of the producer currency pricing trade costs have no influence on the
firms’ decisions of price setting. The law of one price obviously holds only
in the case of zero trade costs. If domestic goods and foreign goods price
indices were equal (pH,t = pF,t), α would measure the share of foreign goods’
consumption, which could be interpreted as a degree of openness. In this model
instead, Section A.1 in the appendix shows that I have a steady state where
P̄H = (1 − κ)P̄F . The situation around such a steady state can be expressed
through log-linearization of (6) as
pt = (1−α′)pH,t +α′pF,t , (19)
where α′ ≡ α/[α+(1−α)(1−κ)1−η].10 This equation, derived in Section A.1
in the appendix, can be combined with Equation (16) to obtain the following
relationship between domestic CPI and the terms of trade:
pt = pH,t +α
′st (20)
9With this “intermediate" definition, I also make sure that the steady state terms of trade are
equal to unity, as it is the case in GM. See also Galí and Monacelli (2005b, Appendix A).
10Note that α′ = α as in GM for κ= 0.
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Replacing pF,t in Equation (16) by Equation (13) and plugging the result in
(18) gives rise to a relationship between the domestic CPI, the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate:
qt = (1−α′)st . (21)
Nominal net exports are given by
PH,t NX t = PH,t Yt − Pt Ct . (22)
As Section A.3 of the appendix shows, log-linearizing this equation around the
steady state results in





where the steady state ratio PC
PH Y
depends on the parameters α, κ, η and σ and
equals unity in the case of zero trade costs.
2.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium: Market Clearing
Since there is no possibility to invest in capital, and as the small open economy
is negligible for the rest of the world, the foreign country’s goods market is
cleared if output supply equals its own consumption:
Y ∗t = C
∗
t . (24)
In the small open economy, output is consumed at home or abroad. However,
because a fraction κ of the bundle exported “melts away" in the trade process,
consumption abroad is only 1− κ times the domestic bundle intended for ex-
port, C∗H,t = (1−κ)(Yt−CH,t). Hence, in the small open economy goods market
clearing is given by




In the labor markets, firms set wages so that their demand of labor is supplied
by the domestic agents. The international asset market is cleared as the nom-
inal portfolio is in zero net supply. On the currency market, each countries’
central bank supplies the amount of currency that is demanded.
Definition 1. Given policy rules for Rt , an equilibrium is an allocation
{Dt , Ct , (C j,t) j∈{H,F}, (Ci, j,t)i∈[0,1], Lt , Yt , (Yj,t) j∈{H,F}, (Yi, j,t)i∈[0,1]}∞t=0 and a price
system
{Wt , Pt , (Pj,t) j∈{H,F}, (Pi, j,t)i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, such that
1. given prices, the allocation maximizes the utility of the household,
2. given prices and the demand function for Yi, j,t , the allocation maximizes the
profits of the firms, subject to the Calvo-sticky prices,
3. markets clear,




The expenditures of the representative household are distributed optimally be-
tween all firms of a country as well as between home country and the rest of






C j,t ∀ j ∈ {H, F} (26)












Maximizing the household’s utility function leads to a standard intratemporal

















= 1 . (29)
Log-linearization yields
wt − pt = σct +ϕnt and ct = Et{ct+1} −
1
σ
(rt − Et{πt+1}). (30)
As shown in the appendix Section A.4, Equation (29) and its world analog11 can







where the parameter ϑ depends on initial conditions regarding the relative size




















)] = 1 holds.
12It is assumed that the initial distribution of wealth fulfills ϑ = α
∗
α
, i. e. equals the ratio of the
two economies’ import valuations.
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2.3.2 Analysis: Firms
Aggregation of individual firms’ production functions and log-linearizing around
the steady state yields the (log) supply of output
yt = nt + at . (33)
In every period, firm i has a probability of (1−θ) that it is allowed to adjust
its price. If this is the case in period t, and as each firm has market power, it sets
its new price PH,t with a markup over marginal costs so that for the expected
duration of that price the present discounted value of its expected earnings is
maximized. Given the maximization problem of Equations (8) and (9) and as
shown in appendix Section A.5, the log-linear price setting rule is







where pH,t is the newly set price in period t and Ómc
n
t is the log-deviation
of nominal marginal costs around the steady state. As appendix Section A.6
shows, the inflation dynamics in the small open economy and in the world
economy are given by









Both fiscal policy authorities set their employment subsidy to offset monopo-
listic distortion. For reasons of comparability with GM I rely on their values,13








for the world economy, where the α∗-term drops as the degree of openness
there is essentially zero.
Monetary policy in the world economy leads to a fully stable world output











13GM derive these values under the special case in which σ = η = 1 holds. See Galí and
Monacelli (2002, pp. 22ff.).
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The authority for monetary policy in the small open economy follows the Tay-
lor rule given in Equation (10). Alternatively, I also analyze a strict domestic
inflation targeting (DIT) policy, a domestic inflation targeting rule (DITR), a
CPI targeting rule (CITR) and an exchange rate peg (PEG).
2.3.4 Analysis: Canonical Representation
The model can be written in four equations, a Phillips curve and a dynamic IS
curve for both the small open and the world economy. Denoting a variable’s
deviation from its natural level that would pertain in a flexible price world by
an upper tilde, the equations are:






ỹt = Et{ ỹt+1} −
ω
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − r r
′
t) (40)







t+1} − r r
∗
t ) , (41)














defined after Equation (19) and ΦSS2 after Equation (23), and ΦNKPC∗ ≡ λ(σ+
ϕ). The r r-terms are the natural expected rates of interest in the small open
and the world economy, respectively, which would prevail under completely
flexible prices. They are given by














A derivation of these equations is given in appendix Section A.7. Together with
rules for monetary policies and the exogenous stochastic processes, the model
is complete.
3 Puzzles and Deduced Moments
This section briefly states the six puzzling data observations, as collected by
OR. It then focuses on the specific moments of the data that may be used to
evaluate the corresponding moments of the model and thereby the model’s fit.
In choosing these data moments I often allow for a wide range of values. This is
the consequence of the existing variability in observation moments across time
and countries.
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3.1 Home Bias in Trade (Puzzle 1)
In an Arrow-Debreu world of complete international markets without any bar-
riers to trade, an equal amount of products is traded across international and
intra-national borders, so that borders do not matter for trade. In reality, we
see that there is significantly less trade across international borders, i.e., do-
mestic products are preferred. This is pointed out by e. g. McCallum (1995)
for the example of the U.S. versus Canada. McCallum found 22 times less trade
across the border than across interstate borders in Canada or in the U.S. In
a more careful study, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that borders
reduce trade between industrialized countries by 29 percent or, in the case of
U.S. - Canadian trade, by 44 percent.
OR propose to use the ratio of domestic consumption expenditure on home
goods to domestic consumption expenditure on imported goods as moment for
the home bias in trade. They argue that 4.2 is a reasonable value for OECD
countries. This implies a home share in consumption of about 80 percent.
Clearly, this number depends on the size of the country considered: the smaller
the country, the fewer goods are produced domestically, and the lower the
number gets. As a starting point, I take values above unity as consistent with a
home bias. To rule out too distinct a bias, I set an upper limit of 19, implying








(1−κ)1−η ∈ [1;19], (44)
depending only on home bias parameter α, trade costs κ and international
substitution elasticity η, according to Equations (27) and (15), evaluated at
the steady state.
3.2 Feldstein-Horioka (Puzzle 2)
If one supposes that capital can move freely across countries and people are
free to invest their money wherever they want, one would suspect that rising
savings in one economy do not necessarily imply rising investments in the same
country. If conditions for investment are temporarily better abroad, the savings
should all be directed to foreign countries, leaving investments in the home
country constant or reducing them. With this in mind one would expect a low
correlation between savings and investment in open economies with free cap-
ital movements. Instead, the data shows a high positive correlation: Feldstein
and Horioka (1980) found a coefficient of 0.89 for 16 OECD countries between
1960 and 1974. A regression for a 22 OECD country sample between 1982-91
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 162) results in a coefficient of 0.62, while
the latest regression by the same authors (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000b, Table
1) for the 24 OECD countries between 1990-97 yields 0.60. Although there is a
decreasing trend, the absolute value of the correlation coefficient is still large.
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To evaluate where the model’s savings are invested, one has to solve for the
country portfolios. Given that I use a log-linear approximation to find the model
solution, this is not an easy task, for two reasons, as pointed out by Devereux
and Sutherland (2007, p.9): “Firstly, the equilibrium portfolio is indeterminate
in a first-order approximation of the model. And secondly, the equilibrium port-
folio is indeterminate in the non-stochastic steady state.” Recently, researchers
have drawn their attention to this problem and have come up with different
solution approaches, e.g. Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008), Coeurdacier
(2009), Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and Engel and Matsumoto (2008).14
One finding of these papers highlighted in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008)
is that in a complete markets model, “the equilibrium equity portfolios are
extremely sensitive to the values of preference parameters. Whether the coeffi-
cient of relative risk aversion is smaller, bigger than or equal to unity, whether
domestic and foreign goods are substitute or complements, equity portfolios
can exhibit home, foreign, or no bias. In other words, this class of models
predict delivers equity portfolios that are unstable.” Because of this, and be-
cause of comparability between my results and those derived in Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000b), in the following I stick to the approach OR take to address this
puzzle. They built a stylized model to show that “countries running current
account surpluses should have lower real interest rates than countries running
deficits.”15 This implies a negative correlation between net exports nx t and the
domestic real interest rate rt −πt . So I take as the second moment
P2= Corr(nx t , rt −πt) ∈ [−1;0]. (45)
Of course, one may cast doubts on this correlation as adequate translation of
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, and indeed Jeanne (2000) has raised concerns
against this approach. But for the current study, I leave this issue unresolved
and take the moment at face value.
3.3 Home Bias in Equity Portfolio (Puzzle 3)
In 2005, Canadians held about 76 percent of their equity wealth in their do-
mestic stock market. However, the Canadian equity market capitalization ac-
counted for less than four percent of the world equity market capitalization. In
a world of complete risk diversification, this pronounced home bias is difficult
to explain. The average home bias across 20 OECD countries is 70 percent,
ranging from 31 percent for the Netherlands to above 90 percent for countries
like Japan, Greece or Russia.16 In my model, there is free and costless trade
in a complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities. Under complete
markets, consumption shares are equal to shares in world wealth. Obstfeld and
14A lucid summary of the recent developments is given in Obstfeld (2007).
15See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, p.358) and Table 3 therein for empirical evidence.
16Data from Sercu and Vanpee (2008), as reprinted in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008).
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Rogoff (1996, Section 5.3) show that (given zero trade costs) these shares are
also equal to portfolio shares. For the special case in which σ = 1/η holds,
the Arrow-Debreu allocation is identical to a world where trade is only in eq-
uity shares.17 In that case one can thus evaluate home bias in equity portfolios
directly. For the more general case where σ 6= 1/η, OR show that consump-
tion shares are nonetheless relatively constant over a wide range of parameter
combinations and are thus a good approximation to equity portfolio shares.18
Hence, I follow OR and rely on steady state consumption shares as an indica-
tor for equity portfolio shares. I define the small open economy’s steady state
home bias equivalently to the portfolio home bias definition given in Coeur-
dacier and Gourinchas (2008):19 Home bias is given as one minus the share
of foreign equities (consumption) in the small open economy’s equity holdings
(total consumption), divided by the share of foreign equities (consumption in
the rest of the world) in the total market portfolio (overall consumption). By
definition the home bias is zero in case the share of domestic equities (con-
sumption) in the small open economy is equal to the share of domestic equities












PF P ∈ [0.32;0.92]. (46)
Notice that I have used Equations (31) and (27) at the steady state to rephrase
the equation. One can see that the moment depends on the parameters α, η, κ
and α∗ only, where the last parameter is assumed to be fixed.
3.4 Low International Consumption Correlation (Puzzle 4)
If risks were pooled internationally, changes in consumption would be perfectly
correlated across countries to hedge against country specific risk. However, in
the real world this is not the case. Despite the intuitive relative consumption
smoothing argument, consumption is even less correlated internationally than
is output: compared to the “world" analog, the correlation of consumption
growth in the OECD countries lies somewhere between 0.27 for Italy and 0.63
for Germany, with an average of 0.43. At the same time, output growth corre-
lations are nearly always higher, between 0.42 for Japan and 0.70 for Canada
and Germany, with an average of 0.52.20 Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995,
Tables 1 and 2) report correlations relative to the U.S. instead of a “world"
17See OR and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
18See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, pp. 363 and Table 4). Obstfeld (2007) emends an approx-
imation error, which nonetheless does not overturn the general picture.
19The last page shows a reprint of the 2007 version of Sercu and Vanpee (2008). The published
version avoids the term “home bias".
20Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 291), data from Penn World Tables for the period 1973 to
1993. The “world" analog means 35 benchmark countries.
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analog. Hence, they have slightly different numbers, but generally the same
findings. Moreover, they find productivity21 to be internationally less corre-
lated than output. They call this puzzle “the consumption/output/productivity
anomaly, or the quantity anomaly".22 I choose the ratio of consumption to out-
put correlations as my fourth moment, which is between about 0.5 for Italy and
about 1 for the U.K.:
P4=
Corr(ct , c∗t )
Corr(yt , y∗t )
∈ [0.5;1]. (47)
3.5 Purchasing Power Parity (Puzzle 5)
Rogoff (1996) phrases the purchasing power parity puzzle question as follows:
“How can one reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange
rates with the extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out?"23 The
standard deviation of the real exchange rate typically amounts to about eight
percent.24 The autocorrelation of the real exchange rate Corr(qt , qt−1) is about
0.83.25 As this puzzle has two dimensions, I collect two data moments based
on Chari et al. (2002):
P51= Std(qt) = 7.52 (48)
P52= Corr(qt , qt−1) = 0.83. (49)
3.6 Exchange Rate Disconnect (Puzzle 6)
Another fact concerning the real, but also to the nominal exchange rate is the
missing of a strong connection to any other macroeconomic variable. This fea-
ture can be examined from two points of view: a) a connection could be seen
if the high volatility of exchange rates would have an effect on the volatility
of some other macroeconomic variable. In this respect, the disconnect shows
up in a situation in which, “while exchange rate volatility is ultimately tied
to volatility in the fundamental shocks to the economy, the exchange rate can
display extremely high volatility without any implications for the volatility of
other macroeconomic variables."26 As Flood and Rose (1995) show, moving
21Productivity is measured by the Solow residual z of a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function Yt = Zt Kθt N
1−θ
t .
22Backus et al. (1995, p. 343).
23Rogoff (1996, p. 647).
24Chari et al. (2002, Table 2) report 7.52 percent for quarterly, logged, Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-
filtered European post-Bretton Woods real exchange rates relative to the U.S. Dollar, Kollmann
(2001, p. 254) reports 8.89 percent for an average of Germany, Japan and the U.K. versus the
U.S.
25Chari et al. (2002, Table 1) report values between 0.77 and 0.86 for quarterly, logged,
Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filtered European post-Bretton Woods data relative to the U.S. Dollar,
with an average of 0.83. Kollmann (2001, p. 254) comes to a value of 0.78 for a slightly shorter
time span of data for Japan, Germany and the U.K.
26Devereux and Engel (2002, p. 4).
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from floating to fixed exchange rates or into the other direction does not influ-
ence the volatility of other macroeconomic variables. b) The disconnect is also
a question of correlations between the exchange rate and other variables such
as output or prices. Kollmann (2001, p. 254) reports correlations with domes-
tic GDP between -0.21 and 0.15 for Japanese, German and U.K. post-Bretton
Woods data, on average -0.07 for the nominal and -0.01 for the real exchange
rate. As for the previous puzzle, I select two moments: first, the standard de-
viation of the real U.S. $ exchange rate relative to that of real GDP, which is
4.36 percent, according to Chari et al. (2002).27 Second, the contemporaneous
correlation between the real U.S. $ exchange rate and real GDP, which Chari
et al. (2002) report to be 0.08.28
P61= Std(qt)/Std(yt) = 4.36 (50)
P62= Corr(qt , yt) = 0.08. (51)
While puzzles 1 and 3 follow immediately from the model’s steady state,
the remaining moments are obtained from simulations of the model. I average
the moments of 500 simulations of 100 periods length.
4 Parametrization
For the specification of parameter values I will make use of three different pro-
cedures. In a first step, I use calibration to obtain values for those parameters
that have (a) agreed upon values in the literature and (b) no significant ef-
fect on the model outcome with respect to the six puzzles. In a second step,
I identify a set of parameter values via estimation.This procedure is applied to
parameters that have a close relationship to observable data, like exogenous
processes and the Taylor rule. The third step is choosing the remaining pa-
rameter values to minimize the distance between simulated moments from the
model and the moments implied by the “six puzzles". This procedure is applied
in Jermann (1998) to “maximize the model’s ability to match a set of moments
of interest"29. A textbook treatment under the label Simulated Method of Mo-
ments Estimation (SMM) is given in Canova (2007, Section 5.5.2).
I use data for Canada versus the U.S. for two reasons. First, because of
its relative size and proximity to the U.S., Canada is “a prototype small open
economy".30 Not only is Canada a relatively small country, it also trades mainly
with the U.S.31 so that the assumption of the U.S. as the rest of the world seems
especially plausible. Second, Galí and Monacelli (2005b) use Canadian data for
27See Table 5 in Chari et al. (2002). Kollmann (2001, Table 1) reports 8.89
1.52
= 5.85 percent.
28See Table 6 in Chari et al. (2002). Kollmann (2001, Table 1) reports -0.01.
29Jermann (1998, p. 264).
30Galí and Monacelli (2005b, p. 723).
31According to en.wikipedia.org, about 80 percent of Canadian exports go to and
about two thirds of Canadian imports come from the U.S.
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their numerical analysis. So it seems fair to stick to the same data when putting
the model to test. The dataset used for the analysis is the one built by Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), added by central bank short term interest rates
obtained from IFS. It contains quarterly macroeconomic data for Canada and
the U.S. from 1973:1 till 2000:1, obtained from the IMF’s IFS and the OECD.32
The data are seasonally adjusted, in logs, and HP-filtered. The series contain
real GDP, consumption, net exports, CPI price level, PPI price level, nominal
and real exchange rate, terms of trade and employment. Series for technology
are obtained by use of Equation (33) and its world analog.33
4.1 Calibrated Parameter Values
Results for the first procedure (calibration) are given in column two of Ta-
ble 1. Mostly, the values were chosen in accordance with those of the GM
model. The (quarterly) discount factor β is set to 0.987 according to Coo-
ley and Prescott (1995, p. 21). The net steady state markup µ of roughly
20 percent over marginal costs is consistent with the findings of Rotemberg
and Woodford (1995, pp. 260-261) as well as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004,
p. 11). With µ fixed I have already set the elasticity of substitution between
different firms within a country ε to be six, through µ = log(ε)− log(ε − 1)
from Section A.7 in the appendix. The labor supply elasticity 1/ϕ is fixed at
1/ϕ = 1/3, like in GM. Benigno (2004) proposes a value of 0.67, whereas
Blanchard and Fischer (1989) report a low value between 0 and 0.45.34 Yun
(1996) calibrates his model with 1/ϕ = 1/4. I also tested values between zero
and unity and found that the model’s performance is not affected. Finally, the
degree of openness parameter for the world economy α∗ has to be fixed close
to zero to maintain the small open economy assumption.
4.2 Estimated Parameter Values
The second procedure was applied for the Taylor rule (TR). Again, results are
given in Table 1, columns three and four. For t estimation of the Taylor rule for
Canada I follow the example of Clarida et al. (1998) and use the generalized
method of moments (GMM). Instruments are eight lags of inflation, output gap
and interest rate (R2 = 0.82, standard errors in parentheses).
rt = 0.90
(0.02)




∗ (yt − ȳt)) + εMt . (52)
For the estimation of the stochastic processes I rely on Galí and Monacelli
(2005b). They assume AR(1) processes for log Canadian labor productivity
32The original dataset contains data 17 OECD countries and a longer sample period for most
series, which allows for an extended analysis in future work.
33This results in the standard correlation pattern given e.g. in Uhlig (2003).
34See Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapters 7 and 8, especially pp. 338-342 and 388.
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and log U.S. GDP and obtain
at = 0.66
(0.06)





∗) = 0.0078 (54)
with a correlation between the two shocks of 0.3. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. It is clear that the international correlation of productivity shocks
will have an influence on the puzzle outcomes. Especially the international
consumption correlation and the real exchange rate correlation would be sig-
nificantly affected if I took this parameter as free in my minimization procedure
laid out below. Nonetheless, I abstain from making use of this opportunity as I
regard this parameter to be given by the data.
4.3 Simulated Method of Moments Parameter Values
Applying the third procedure, I single out five parameters that mainly influence
the model’s features relative to the six puzzles or, in the case of price stickiness,
are key to this class of models. These are the international substitution elasticity
η, the constant of relative risk aversion σ, the small open economy’s openness
parameter α, the Calvo price stickiness parameter for both economies θ = θ ∗
and the trade costs parameter κ. Let Θ1 be the vector of these five model
parameters: Θ1 = [η,σ,α,θ ,κ]′. I choose Θ1 in order to minimize
ℑ= [Θ2− f (Θ1)]′Ω[Θ2− f (Θ1)], (55)
where Θ2 = [P1, P2, P3, P4, P51, P52, P61, P62]′ is the vector of moments to
be matched, given by equations (44) to (51). f (Θ1) is a 8× 1 vector which
contains the corresponding moments generated by the model. The weighting
matrix Ω is chosen as a diagonal matrix with the inverse of each data mean
as the diagonal elements. Since many of the data moments are given in target
ranges, the expressionΘ2− f (Θ1) is not trivial. Following Uhlig (2004), I allow
for these ranges by combining maximum and minimum functions:














min(19 − f (Θ1)1, 0) +max(1 − f (Θ1)1, 0)
min(0 − f (Θ1)2, 0) +max(−1 − f (Θ1)2, 0)
min(0.92− f (Θ1)3, 0) +max(0.32− f (Θ1)3, 0)



















For the minimization process, the model solution has to be calculated. This is
done using standard techniques, as explained in Uhlig (1999). To minimize the
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criterion function ℑ, I furthermore need to set starting values and boundaries
to the parameters in Θ1.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η typi-
cally takes values between unity, as in Galí and Monacelli (2005b) and some-
thing as high as 20, as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) say. In between lie η= 1.5
as in Backus et al. (1995, pp. 346-347.) and the OR benchmark of η = 6. The
higher the substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, the bigger the
home biases get. But there is a theoretical qualification to this. The elasticity of
substitution between different domestic goods ε is set to six, in order to allow
for a steady state markup of 20 percent above marginal costs. It seems unre-
alistic that substitutability is much higher internationally than intranationally.
Engel (2000) raises exactly this question at the end of his comment on the “Six
Puzzles"; he proposes the intranational elasticity to be twice as high as the in-
ternational. I follow his suggestion and restrict η to be between 1 and 12. As a
a starting value, I set η= 3.
The risk aversion parameter σ, also the inverse of the intertemporal rate of
substitution, is difficult to determine: GM and Yun (1996) use σ = 1, implying
log utility of consumption. Erceg, Henderson and Levine (2000, p. 299) use 1.5
forσ, Cochrane calls values between one and two standard,35 Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2002) choose a high value of σ = 5 and argue that this is needed
to obtain volatile exchange rates. Like GM, I use σ = 1 as my starting value and
allow it to be between 0.2 and as much as 10, which is also the upper bound in
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
The degree of openness parameter α should be between zero and unity,
where one half implies no home bias and more than one half is a bias towards
foreign goods. GM choose α = 0.4 as their baseline value to match the import
to GDP ratio for Canada. I follow them with my starting value and set the
boundaries to zero and 0.9, where the upper boundary implies a bias towards
foreign goods. This might be especially reasonable for very small countries
which produce only a restricted subset of all goods.
The Calvo sticky price parameter θ = θ ∗, assumed to be identical across
countries, is typically set to 0.75, implying an average price duration of four
quarters, 1
1−θ = 4. This is also my starting value. In the SMM estimation, I
choose θ from the interval [0.0,0.9], implying price changes between every
quarter and every 10th quarter.
Finally, the trade costs’ starting value is set to 25 percent, the value OR
choose as their “baseline". Midrigan (2007) chooses a distribution of trade
costs that replicates moments of certain export shares. He comes up with trade
costs between 2 percent and 48 percent, with a mean of 20 percent. Relative
to the sources reported in OR, 20 or 25 percent are high, but taking into ac-
count that about a half of total output is nontraded, the number might become
35Cochrane (1997, p. 15). The asset pricing literature yields for even higher values to explain
the equity premium puzzle.
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more reasonable. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report a 170 percent tax
equivalent of trade costs. This number breaks down into 21 percent transporta-
tion costs, 44 precent border related trade barriers, and 55 percent retail and
wholesale distribution costs. Of course, “iceberg” trade costs cannot be bigger
than unity, as unit trade costs lead to autarky of the two then closed economies.
Given the degree of uncertainty about this parameter, I hardly restrict the SMM
estimation using the interval [0.0;0.9].
Boundaries and starting values for the parameters inΘ1 are given in columns
four and two of Table 1. The resulting estimates are given in column five of the
same table.
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Calibration Estimation SMM Range SMM Explanation
Preferences
β 0.987 – – – Discount factor
η 3.00 – [1.0;12] 1.0 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
ε 6.00 – – Elasticity of substitution among goods within each category
σ 1.00 – [0.2;10] 3.15 Constant of relative risk aversion
ϕ 3.00 – – – Inverse of labor supply elasticity
α 0.40 – [0.0;0.9] 0.05 Degree of openness of the small open economy
α∗ 0.001 – – – Degree of openness of the world economy
Technology
θ = θ ∗ 0.75 – [0.0;0.9] 0.78 Percentage of firms that cannot (re)set prices in period t
µ 0.182 – – – Log of the gross steady state markup
κ 0.25 – [0.0;0.9] 0.39 Trade costs
Monetary Policy
ρTR – 0.90 (0.02) – – Degree of interest rate smoothing
β TR – 2.20 (0.15) – – Coefficient on next period inflation
γTR – 2.43 (0.83) – – Coefficient on output gap
Processes
σε – 0.0071(–) – – Standard deviation of domestic productivity shock
σε∗ – 0.0078(–) – – Standard deviation of world GDP shock
ρa – 0.66 (0.06) – – Autocorrelation of domestic productivity AR(1) process
ρ∗y – 0.86 (0.04) – – Autocorrelation of world GDP AR(1) process
ρa,y∗ – 0.30 (–) – – Cross-correlation of productivity shocks
Notes: Column 2 includes calibrated values as well as the starting values for the SMM estimation, column 3 has standard errors in parentheses, column 4
shows the allowed values for the simulated method of moments estimation and column 5 gives the SMM estimates.
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5 Results
As the title of this paper might suggest, the results of this model are not too
bad. Table 2 reports how the thus parameterized model performs against the
six puzzles.
Table 2: Baseline Results for the Taylor Rule Model
Criterion Moment Value Lower Data Upper
Puzzle 1 PH CH/(PF CF ) 19.36 1 19
Puzzle 2 Corr(nx t , rt −πt) -0.48 -1 0
Puzzle 3 1− CF/C
C∗/(C+C∗) 0.97 0.32 0.92
Puzzle 4 Corr(ct , c∗t )/Corr(yt , y
∗
t ) 2.83 0.5 1
Puzzle 51 Std(qt) 1.97 7.52
Puzzle 52 Corr(qt , qt−1) 0.61 0.83
Puzzle 61 Std(qt)/Std(yt) 3.13 4.36
Puzzle 62 Corr(qt , yt) 0.63 0.08
Notes: The baseline results use the parametrization given in Table 1. In particular, κ = 0.39,
θ = 0.78, α = 0.05, η = 1 and σ = 3.15. “Data" refers to the target ranges or values discussed
in Section 3.
We see that with sizeable trade costs of close to 40 percent and a small de-
gree of openness parameter, implying a steady state import share of only five
percent, the model is able to replicate strong home biases in consumption and
in equity portfolio. These biases are slightly above what is observed for typi-
cal small OECD countries, but not by much. Puzzle 2 in its translated form is
nicely replicated: The correlation between net exports and the real interest rate
is right in the range of what OR estimated for OECD countries. A high relative
risk aversion of more than three, low international substitutability and a small
degree of openness lead to volatile real exchange rates. This is in accordance
with the argument in Hau (2002) that less open economies experience a higher
exchange rate volatility. Compared to the model results with calibrated param-
eter values, the number for real exchange rate volatility is extraordinarily big:
Nonetheless, the volatility is not as big as in the data, both per se and relative
to GDP volatility. With respect to the correlation pattern of the real exchange
rate the findings are mixed: The autocorrelation of the real exchange rate is a
bit low in the model, the correlation with GDP is too big. The perhaps worst
outcome concerns the consumption correlation puzzle. The ratio of correla-
tions is 2.83, which is way above the expected value of less than one. This
ratio is the result of an international output correlation of only 0.14, whereas
the international correlation of consumption is 0.47. Though the data does not
provide a very clear pattern, this combination is not realistic.
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5.1 Do Trade Costs Improve the Model’s Fit?
The original model of GM does not include trade costs. On the other hand, OR
argue that “the effects of home bias in preferences [...] can be isomorphic to the
effects of trade costs".36 So a natural question is whether or not a model with
zero trade costs or a model with no home bias can fare equally well. Results to
this are reported in Table 3.
Table 3: Comparison of Results:
Trade Costs and Degree of Home Bias Parameter in the Trade Costs Model
Criterion Data Baseline κ= 0 α= .5 κ=0, α=.5 κ= .9999
κ – 0.39 0 0.26 0 0.9999
θ – 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.71
α – 0.05 0.40 0.5 0.5 0.56
η – 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.30
σ – 3.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73
Puzzle 1 [1; 19] 19.36 1.50 1.84 1.00 13.45
Puzzle 2 [−1;0] -0.48 -0.57 -0.43 -0.33 -0.10
Puzzle 3 [.32; .92] 0.97 0.60 0.70 0.50 1.00
Puzzle 4 [0.5;1] 2.83 9.13 9.55 10.58 1.14
Puzzle 51 7.52 1.97 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.81
Puzzle 52 0.83 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Puzzle 61 4.36 3.13 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.97
Puzzle 62 0.08 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.48
min ℑ – 36.10 134.09 140.76 161.49 56.71
As column three of this table shows, the zero trade costs model does not
leave out a lot in terms of the correlation between net exports and the real in-
terest rate and in terms of the correlation pattern of real exchange rates. Also,
the home bias puzzles can be addressed without relying on trade costs. But
the volatility of the real exchange rate is significantly smaller in a model with-
out trade costs. This is an aspect in favor of OR’s idea. But notice that the
estimation process did not deviate from the parameters’ starting values, which
may indicate some estimation deficiency. Column four of Table 3 shows the
case without the home bias in preferences or degree of openness parameter,
i.e. α = 0.5. The result here is very much comparable to the one obtained
in a model without trade costs. Hence, the isomorphic effects of the two pa-
rameters are shown here. The case of excluding both trade costs and openness
parameter is depicted in column five. Here, exchange rate volatility is espe-
36See OR, p. 348.
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cially difficult to obtain. As the comparison shows, the combination of trade
costs and openness parameter can do a lot in this respect. Finally, the last col-
umn shows the estimation outcome if trade costs are fixed to a prohibitively
high number κ = 0.9999, implying that virtually nothing of an exported good
arrives at the destination market. This was done just for theoretical consider-
ations. In this case, there is an offsetting foreign bias in consumption, as well
as high intertemporal substitutability. While relative consumption correlation
(P4) is decreased significantly, the outcome on the real exchange rate volatility
dimension (P51 and P61) is worse than in the baseline model.
5.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
In this section, I briefly check whether or not the previous results hinge on
the estimated monetary policy rule. My deviations from this rule are along
the suggestions in Galí and Monacelli (2005b). In particular, I investigate four
different monetary policies:
1. Strict domestic inflation targeting (DIT), which GM show to be optimal
from a welfare perspective under certain parameter restrictions. This rule
can be written as follows:
rt = r r t +ΦππH,t +Φy ỹt , (57)
where the last two summands are only added to circumvent indetermi-
nacy, as explained in Galí and Monacelli (2005b).
2. A domestic inflation targeting rule (DITR), which relates the domestic
short-term nominal interest rate only to the domestic inflation rate,
rt = ΦππH,t . (58)
3. A CPI inflation targeting rule (CITR), as given by
rt = Φππt . (59)
4. And finally an exchange rate peg (PEG) that fixes the domestic nominal




Estimation results for these alternative monetary policy rules are given in Table
4. We see that despite the differences in the level of abstraction, and despite
the differences in the estimated parameter values, there are no substantial dif-
ferences in terms of the model fit. As expected, the model fit measured by the
value of the minimization problem ℑ is best for the estimated Taylor rule (TR),
but it is nearly as good for strict domestic inflation targeting (DIT).
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Table 4: Comparison of Results for Different Monetary Policy Rules
Criterion TR DIT DITR CITR PEG
κ 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.90 0.41
θ 0.78 0.90 0.38 0.90 0.87
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
η 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.03
σ 3.15 3.11 1.67 1.14 1.62
Puzzle 1 19.36 19.37 19.13 19.05 19.06
Puzzle 2 -0.48 -0.65 -0.81 -0.75 0.46
Puzzle 3 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97
Puzzle 4 2.83 2.85 1.59 1.65 1.56
Puzzle 51 1.97 1.96 1.47 1.11 1.44
Puzzle 52 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Puzzle 61 3.13 3.09 1.88 1.27 1.84
Puzzle 62 0.63 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.56
Minimization ℑ 36.10 36.43 43.44 51.33 43.93
5.3 Results for the GM Baseline Model
We have seen that a carefully estimated model with trade costs performs very
well in the cross-validation of the puzzling data. But what about the original
GM model? What if their “special case" calibration and their then optimal DIT
policy is used? In that case, σ = η = 1, θ = 0.75, α = 0.4 and, of course,
κ = 0. All other parameters are virtually the same as here. The result of this
endeavor is presented in Table 5. For comparison reasons, I also add column
three of Table 2, containing the moments of my TR parameter estimation. What
we see from this is that the original GM model does very well compared to the
estimated TR model. Its only comparative weakness is the very low exchange
rate volatility.
6 Conclusion
Can the Galí and Monacelli (2005b) model replicate the six major puzzles in in-
ternational macroeconomics, as collected by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b)? At
first glance, this seems to be a challenging endeavor: This model is highly styl-
ized, with complete financial markets, no capital, and a minimum of shocks and
frictions. Nonetheless, some insight might be obtained. This textbook model
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Table 5: Comparison of the TR Model with the GM DIT Model
Criterion Data TR GM DIT
Puzzle 1 [1;19] 19.36 1.50
Puzzle 2 [−1;0] -0.48 -0.63
Puzzle 3 [.32; .92] 0.97 0.60
Puzzle 4 [0.5;1] 2.83 2.74
Puzzle 51 7.52 1.97 0.65
Puzzle 52 0.83 0.61 0.62
Puzzle 61 4.36 3.13 0.82
Puzzle 62 0.08 0.63 0.48
Notes: The GM DIT model is calibrated as suggested in GM, especially σ = η= 1, θ = 0.75,
α= 0.4, and κ= 0. The TR model is parameterized as given in Table 1.
is widely used in academics and at central banks. It forms the way economists
think about monetary policy in open economies. If the model deviates essen-
tially from reality along the six puzzles, its usefulness should be doubted. So I
have put up the fight between a stylized model and the rich and puzzling data.
And it turns out to be a good one: Given the simplicity of the model, it performs
quite well. This result holds true even for the case of a very stylized, close to
optimal monetary policy in the small open economy.
Against expectance, the combination of two rather isomorphic ingredients
– trade costs and a home bias in preferences – helps a lot to bring the model
close to the data. So OR’s assumption that trade costs do help in resolving the
six puzzles proves true.
There are three big deficiencies for the model: First, the international cor-
relation pattern of output and consumption, termed as quantity anomaly by
Backus et al. (1995), is not met in any of the model specifications considered.
All parameter combinations investigated result in a situation where interna-
tional consumption correlation is higher than international output correlation.
Given the simplicity of the model stochastics, this might simply be an artefact
of the assumed productivity correlation. Indeed, changing the latter results in
an improvement along this dimension. However, since this correlation is in-
herent in the data, its influence on the model accuracy will be neglected here.
The second deficiency is the volatility of the real exchange rate, which still re-
mains too low compared to the data. Nonetheless, compared to the original
GM calibration, my baseline choice of parameter implies a strong increase in
the real exchange rate volatility. For further increases, the literature has shown
that pricing-to-market arrangements may help a lot, but this is left for future
research. The third and last deficiency is the high correlation between real ex-
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change rate and output, which is seen in all specifications of the model. As a
remedy for this, one should again think about a richer set of stochastic elements
in the model. Another promising topic is the inclusion of a more realistic fiscal
policy instead of the production subsidy assumed so far.
If these deficiencies are important for a specific research question, one
should not rely on the stylized New Keynesian small open economy model ex-
amined in this paper. Instead, one should look for a more elaborated model.
In case these deficiencies are of minor importance, I have shown in Section





For the derivation of the nonstochastic perfect foresight steady state, I assume
without loss of generality that steady state domestic technology A = 1. For
notational simplicity, I omit a variable’s time subscript to denote its steady state.
In the steady state, prices are flexible and markups are constant. In connection
























where the latter equation used the steady state relationship Y = AN = N . From
the risk sharing condition (31) we obtain
C = ϑY ∗Q
1
σ , (64)



























where the second line replaced the price ratio and the real exchange rate by

















see Equations (11), (12), (15) and (17).
Furthermore, transforming the market clearing condition (25) gives rise to
a second equation linking domestic output to foreign output and the terms of
29
trade:












































where α∗ is replaced by αϑ, where ϑ = C0
C∗0
denotes initial conditions of the
model. Equations (66) and (71) together determine the terms of trade and
domestic output as functions of world output. The unique solution for the
terms of trade is given by S = (1−κ)PF
PH
= 1. This result can be used to simplify
the CPI Equation (6)




= [α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−η]P̄1−ηF (74)
















η−1 ≡ ΦPF P . (76)
Notice that these ratios are equal to unity if trade costs are zero, κ = 0, or if



























ϑY ∗ = ΦSS2ϑY
∗. (78)















Some remarks are in order. First, in the case of zero trade costs, ΦSS2 = 1
and Y = ϑY ∗, as in GM. For positive trade costs (and η > 1), the relative size
of domestic output increases, as ΦSS2 > 1. Trade costs decrease the demand
for imports and increase domestic production. As the small open economy is
by definition more open, this effect is more pronounced for the small open
economy. Hence, the size effect on the output ratio Y /Y ∗.
Second, for positive trade costs, ΦPF P > 1 > ΦPHP , i. e., the price index of
imports is higher than the average price index, reflecting transport costs.
Third, the steady state real exchange rate Q = ΦPHPS is unity under zero
trade costs, but smaller than unity for κ > 0.
Fourth, inspecting Equation (64), steady state consumption in the small
open economy equals domestic output for zero trade costs. For positive trade
costs, steady state consumption becomes smaller than steady state output. At
first glance, this might seem unreasonable, as it suggests that the small open
economy does not spend all its income. However, this is not the case, as “some
portion of the traded good dissipates in transit".37
Fifth, trade costs also influence steady state net exports. Nominal net ex-
ports are given by Equation (22). In steady state, this reads
NX = Y − PC/PH = Y − C/ΦPHP . (81)
As in GM steady state net exports are zero for κ = 0, but they are negative for
positive trade costs, where ΦPHP < 1.
A.2 Log-Linearization of the CPI Equation
I linearly approximate the domestic CPI, as given by Equation (6) around the


















where small letters denote log deviations from the steady state. The constant
steady state ratios PH/P and PF/P are derived in Section A.1 of the appendix,



















= (1−α′)pH,t +α′pF,t . (84)
37See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 251).
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The last equation is Equation (19) in the text. Notice that the coefficients
1 − α′ and α′ sum up to one like 1 − α and α in GM, they actually coincide
with them in the case of zero trade costs κ = 0. These coefficients show the
relative importance of changes in domestic producer prices and import prices
for changes in the CPI. In GM, the baseline value α = 0.4 implies that import
prices affect the CPI by 40 percent. In my baseline calibration with substitution
elasticity η= 1.5 and trade costs κ= 0.25, this effect is reduced to 36.6 percent
as a result of the trade reducing costs. Notice, however, that trade costs only
influence the CPI if the international substitution elasticity is non-unitary. Using
the same value for this elasticity as for the intranational substitution elasticity,
i.e., setting η= ε = 6, the effect of imports on the CPI is reduced by more than
one half, to 13.7 percent. The higher the substitutability between domestic
and foreign goods, the easier it is to replace trade cost affected imports by
domestically produced goods. Finally, in the OR baseline of η = 6, κ = 0.25
and α = 0.5 (no home bias), the effect of imports is again strongly reduced to
19.2 percent.
A.3 Log-Linearization of Net Exports Equation
Nominal net exports are given by
PH,t NX t = PH,t Yt − Pt Ct . (85)
As Section A.1 shows, the steady state implies NX = Y−PC/PH = Y−C/ΦPHP ,
which could be zero. Hence, log deviations of net exports around steady state
cannot be defined in the usual way. Instead, define
nx t ≡
NX t − NX
Y
(86)
to be the percentage deviation of net exports from steady state in terms of
domestic steady state GDP. Rewriting Equation (85), we have




⇔ Y nx t + NX = Y (1+ yt)−
PC
PH
(1+ pt − pH,t + ct) (88)
⇔ nx t = yt −
PC
PH Y






where the last equation, obtained using Equation (20), is Equation (23) in
the main text. The steady state ratio PC
PH Y
can be solved for parameters using











that in the case of zero trade costs, steady state nominal net exports are zero,
and hence PH Y = PC , or ΦPHP = ΦSS2 = 1, so that one obtains the GM result
nx t = yt − ct −α′st .
A.4 Derivation of the Risk Sharing Condition Equation
Equating the domestic Euler Equation (29) and its foreign analog given in foot-


























Using the definition of the real exchange rate, Qt ≡
Et P∗t
Pt




















Iterating this equation backwards and assuming that the period zero real ex-











which, multiplied by the denominator, is Equation (31) in the text.
A.5 Derivation of the Price Setting Rule Equation






θ kEt{Q t,t+k[Yt+k(PH,t −MCnt+k)]} , (94)
subject to the demand function. Demand for domestic good i is the sum of
demand from the small open economy and the world economy. But as a fraction
κ of the good melts away in the trade process, consumption abroad is only 1−κ
of what was meant for export of good i. From the market clearing Equation
(25), we obtain for good i
C∗H,t(i) = (1−κ)[Yt(i)− CH,t(i)]. (95)
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Hence, demand can be written as




























where I have made use of Equation (26) in the second line and of the nominal
exchange rate definition in the third line, where trade costs cancel each other
out in the numerator and in the denominator. At date t + k, good i production
is not bigger than its demand. Replacing the individual price PH,t(i) by the












Each firm sets the same price in equilibrium, so the index i can be dropped. As
equality holds in the optimum, one can replace Yt+k in the maximization prob-
lem by the constraint given in Equation (99). Multiplying by P̄H,t , dividing by











= 0 . (100)


























= 0 . (101)

























Next I log-linearize around the zero inflation, perfect foresight, balanced trade


















yt+k +Ómc t+k + pH,t+k − pt+k −σct+k
©
, (103)
where I have already factored out and divided by the steady state values. Notice
that I have written Ómc t instead of mct , to keep notation consistent with GM
and Galí and Monacelli (2005b), who use mct ≡ log MCt , mcnt ≡ log MC
n
t and
Ómc t ≡ mct −mc, where mc = log MC = log
ε−1
ε
≡ −µ is the steady state real
marginal cost. Simplifying the last equation using
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
k = 1/(1− βθ)
results in











t + pH,t , this can be transformed to







which is Equation (34) in Section 2.3.
A.6 Derivation of the Inflation Dynamics Equation
In the Calvo pricing scheme, the domestic price level given in equation (7) can
be rewritten as the combination of previous period’s price and the newly set
price:







Log-linearizing this equation around a zero inflation steady state results in
pH,t = θ pH,t−1+ (1− θ)p̄H,t . (107)
From the previous paragraph, notice that Equation (105) can be rewritten
as a first-order difference equation in pH,t . Leading the equation by one, taking
conditional expectations and multiplying by βθ and subtracting this from the
original equation gives
p̄H,t = (1− βθ)(Ómc
n
t ) + βθ Et{p̄H,t+1}. (108)
Now, multiply this equation by (1− θ). Then, replace (1− θ)p̄H,t by making
use of Equation (107), both at date t and date t + 1. This results in
pH,t − θ pH,t−1 = (1− θ)(1− βθ)(Ómc
n
t ) + βθ Et{pH,t+1− θ pH,t}. (109)
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Using Ómcnt =Ómc t + pH,t and simplifying, we obtain




which is the small open economy part of Equation (35) in Section 2.3. The
world inflation is determined analogously.
A.7 Derivation of the Canonical Representation
In this section, I derive the dynamic IS equation and the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (NKPC) for the world economy and the small open economy.
Writing the foreign analog of the household’s log-linear Euler Equation (30)
in terms of foreign currency, using the market clearing condition (24), one









For the small open economy, an analog can be achieved in eight steps: First,
I write down the market clearing condition (25) for a domestically produced
good i. Then, I use the demand functions (26) and (27) as well as its world
analogs. Here, notice that under producer currency pricing the substitution
elasticity for domestically produced goods has to be considered. Third, I re-
place total consumption in the small open economy by world output, following
Equation (31):










































































































































































































































































= S −1t during the calcu-
lations.
Step five is log-linearization around the steady state, following the principle















this is well approximated by











Y ∗S η(1+ y∗t +ηst). (118)





















































. Notice that in the case of zero







st , ωα ≡ 1+α(2−α)(ση− 1) > 0 .
As a sixth step, one can use the consumption ratio given in Equation (32),
substitute out st and get an equation that relates ct to domestic and world
output:
ct = Φc yt + (1−Φc)y∗t , (121)
where the parameter Φc ≡
1−α′
ω
. In the seventh step, Equation (121) is used
to replace consumption in the household’s Euler Equation (30), and first dif-
ferences of Equation (20) is used to replace CPI inflation by domestic goods
inflation:









Finally, the eighth and last step is to substitute out ∆st+1 using equation (120)
and to solve for yt . One then obtains a dynamic IS equation for the small open
economy:
yt = Et{yt+1} −
ω
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1}) + (ω− 1) Et{∆y∗t+1} . (123)
To derive the New Keynesian Phillips Curves, I start from Equation (35) de-
rived in this appendix Section A.6. The marginal costs in these equations shall
be replaced by output. Remember from Section 2.2.2, that MCnt = MCt PH,t =
(1−τ)Wt/At , so the log deviation of the real marginal costs of the small open
and the world economy are






























For the small open economy, the same steps and additionally Equation (20)
result in
Ómc t = σct +ϕ yt +α
′st − (1+ϕ)at . (126)
Now, using Equation (32) allows for replacing consumption by world output
and terms of trade,
Ómc t = σy
∗
t +ϕ yt + st − (1+ϕ)at . (127)
Finally, Equation (120) enables us to substitute out st . So marginal costs can












y∗t − (1+ϕ)at . (128)
To use the conventional notation in terms of gaps, the output gap shall be
defined as the deviation of the log-linearized variable from its natural level,
which would occur under flexible prices and thereby constant marginal costs
log MCt = mct = log MC∗t = mc
∗
t = −µ. This implies that the log deviations of
marginal costs from this flex-price steady state are always zero,Ómc t =Ómc
∗
t = 0.




t , where bars above
variables with time index are used to denote their natural levels. To obtain
these natural levels of output, solve Equations (128) and (125) in the flex-price




















= (σ+ϕ) ỹ∗t . (130)














Notice that foreign output does not show up, as for the calculation of the do-
mestic output gap world output is assumed to be exogenous, both in the flex-
price and in the sticky price world.
After inserting the results for marginal costs from Equations (130) and
(131) in the inflation dynamics equations given in (35), I obtain the New Key-
nesian Phillips curves (NKPC) for the small open economy and for the world
39
economy, linking inflation to its expected future value and to the output gap:












and ΦNKPC∗ ≡ λ(σ+ϕ).
For the dynamic IS equations, start with the difference equation for world
output given in equation (111). Evaluate it twice, once for sticky prices and







t ≡ r r
∗
t . (134)
is the natural expected real rate of interest in the world economy, which would
prevail under completely flexible prices. It can be derived by solving Equation
(111) for the flexible price situation characterized by equation (129). Subtract
the flex-price outcome from the sticky price outcome to obtain







t+1} − r r
∗
t ) . (135)
Analogously, the small open economy’s dynamic IS equation is obtained by
subtracting Equation (129) from Equation (123) and simplifying:
ỹt = Et{ ỹt+1} −
ω
σ
(rt − Et{πH,t+1} − r r t) (136)
with the domestic natural expected real rate of interest







again derived evaluating Equation (123) at the flexible price situation described
by equation (129). Equations (132), (133), (136) and (135) are equations
(38), (39), (40) and (41) in Section 2.3.4.
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